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Reflexive Resource Governance as Embedded Process: A Comparison of Two North 
American and Central American Community-Based Forestry Organizations  
 
Abstract 
 
Community-based forestry represents an environmental governance strategy that 
promotes democratic practices, strengthens local livelihoods, and sustains forest 
ecosystems for the benefit of all community members. Much prior research has explored 
the necessary conditions for successful CBF operation. Less attention has been paid to 
how established CBF organizations, as they near the end of the start-up phase of 
operations, confront crucial structural choices about how to respond to shifting political, 
economic, social, and environmental conditions. New challenges facing established CBF 
organizations include transitioning leadership, requirements for more formalized and 
diversified decision making, growth beyond pilot activities into sustained programs, and 
expansion and diversification beyond existing forest activities. What organizational 
structures and processes are needed to confront these new challenges? CBF organizations 
also face new pressures to broaden participation opportunities within their communities 
while retaining adequate commitment to existing participants. Moreover, rapidly 
changing political and environmental conditions pose threats to their future viability as 
resource stewards. This interdisciplinary study will compare organizational transitions in 
two North American and Central American CBF organizations, the Public Lands 
Partnership in Colorado and the Association of Forest Communities of Petén in 
Guatemala. The paper conceptualizes these empirical cases as processes of organizational 
change embedded in multi-scalar contexts rather than sets of static structures best 
designed a priori. The structural choices confronting these organizations must take into 
account both factors internal to the group as well as regional, national, and global 
changes. Participants in these well-established CBF organizations actively pursue a 
“reflexive governance” process in which they seek to adapt collectively to new internal 
and external pressures of rapidly changing environments while maintaining commitment 
to the organizational principles that underlie their historical success: representativeness, 
equity, and legitimacy. This cross-scale study aims to contribute to the understanding of 
the role local resource governance regimes play in the larger architecture of 
environmental governance as they both respond to and help shape larger scale 
governance change. 	 ﾠ
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Reflexive Resource Governance as Embedded Process: A Comparison of Two North 
American and Central American Community-Based Forestry Organizations 
 
I. Introduction 
Community-based forestry (CBF) represents an environmental governance 
strategy that ideally promotes democratic practices, strengthens local livelihoods, and 
sustains forest ecosystems for the benefit of all community members (Baker and Kusel 
2003). Though prior research has explored the necessary conditions for effective CBF 
establishment and operation, less attention has been paid to how relatively well-
established CBF organizations adapt to the problems posed by success. As these 
organizations near the end of start-up phases, they confront new challenges including 
transitioning leadership, requirements for more formalized and diversified decision 
making, growth beyond pilot activities into sustained programs, and expansion and 
diversification beyond existing forest activities. These organizations must make structural 
choices related to change while retaining adequate commitment to existing participants, 
often within the context of rapidly changing political and environmental conditions 
(Herman and Renz 2001).  
This interdisciplinary study compares organizational transitions in two North 
American and Central American CBF organizations, the Public Lands Partnership in 
Colorado and the Association of Forest Communities of Petén in Guatemala. In doing so, 
we seek to inform scholarship in community-based environmental governance that 
organizational structural choices greatly matter to governance effectiveness. We 
conceptualize these empirical cases as processes of organizational change driven by 
internal dynamics and embedded in multi-scalar socio-political contexts rather than as 
sets of static structures best designed a priori. The structural choices confronting these 
organizations must emerge from both pressures internal to the groups as well as those 
stemming from regional, national, and global changes.  
Participants in these two well-established CBF organizations today actively 
pursue a “reflexive governance” process in which they strive to adapt their organizational 
structures and processes while struggling to maintain commitment to four principles that 
underlie the success of any governance approach: representativeness, effectiveness, 	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legitimacy and responsiveness (Brinkerhoff 2008; Lebel et al. 2006; Paavola 2007; 
Taylor 2010). The experience of these two cases suggests that organizations that develop 
an adaptive governance process embedded within nested, multi-scalar socio-political 
contexts can respond more effectively to new conditions while maintaining commitment 
to organizational principles that keep them responsive to the communities that created 
them.  
II. Environmental governance and community-based forestry organization
1 
Community-based forestry may be seen as an experiment in innovative civil 
society-based environmental governance that seeks to link conservation with 
development. By alleviating poverty and enhancing forest-reliant community livelihoods, 
CBF hopes to encourage sustainable resource management (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; 
Brechin et al. 2003). An analytical concept and field of research gaining growing 
importance today, environmental governance includes not only formal governmental 
regulation and law enforcement for conservation, but also invokes the broader political, 
organizational and cultural frameworks through which diverse interests in natural and 
cultural resources are coordinated and controlled (Cronkleton et al. 2008: 1). Researchers 
in recent years have identified and analyzed multiple sets of institutional frameworks for 
environmental governance, including government, civil society, hybrid and market-based 
arrangements (see Hendricks et al. 2009).  
Over the last two decades, researchers and practitioners have noted that CBF 
governance can have significant positive ecological and social impact. They point out 
that CBF’s chances for success are greatly strengthened when secure resource rights, 
supportive policy frameworks and appropriate technical assistance are in place (Bray et 
al. 2005; 2008; Klooster 2000; Sekher 2001; Taylor and Zabin 2000). Nevertheless, 
influential critiques of community-based resource management point to significant 
problems, including uneven performance toward livelihood and conservation goals 
(Campbell et al. 2001), unrealistic assumptions about communities’ internal homogeneity 
and commitment to sustainable management (Agrawal & Gibson 1999; Murray Li 2002), 
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1 Sections II, III and IV draw significantly on Taylor 2010; Taylor et al 2009 and Taylor 
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inequities in benefit distribution (Mayoux 1995) and difficulties in negotiating across 
scales with other interested actors (Wells et al. 2004).  
Researchers and advocates of CBF point out the importance of effective internal 
organization for addressing such weaknesses and increasing the possibility of success 
(Taylor 2010; Wilshusen et al. 2002). Barrett et al. for example, observe that successful 
resource governance depends on organizational capacity to mobilize authority, ability and 
willingness to restrict access and use, technical capacity to monitor ecological and social 
conditions, and flexibility to respond to change (2001: 500). Most attention, nevertheless, 
has been devoted to identifying necessary conditions for organizing CBF initiatives at 
their inception, and improving and consolidating their organizational capacity. As such, 
scholarship has lagged behind practice. Relatively less attention has been paid to 
problems facing more advanced CBF organizations that have achieved significant success 
in the start-up phase and now need to move beyond the first generation organizational 
frameworks if they are to survive as both effective promoters of sustainable resource 
management and reliable interlocutors for member community interests.  
Advanced first generation CBF organizations face unique problems. They often 
need to move beyond pilot, experimental activities toward more sustained programs. 
They face pressure to expand and diversify existing forest activities to sustain member 
support and create new, broader community constituencies. They face pressure to devise 
more formal, institutionalized decision making and administrative structures. These 
challenges often coincide, for better or worse, with the need to manage often-difficult 
transitions of first to second generation leadership. These internal pressures for change 
also often occur as the organizations face increasingly complex political and 
environmental challenges that either enable or pose threats to their future viability and 
legitimacy as resource stewards. These advanced first generation CBF organizations must 
respond to these internal and external pressures without undermining organizational 
characteristics that have shaped their past strengths: representativeness, effectiveness, 
legitimacy and responsiveness.  
Representativeness refers to the degree to which an organization serves as an 
effective space for expression and pursuit of the interests of member constituencies. The 
degree of representativeness in a community-based organization has an important impact 	 ﾠ 4   
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on the equity of distribution of benefits and a concomitant effect on the level of member 
support (Bebbington et al. 1993). Representativeness and equity arrangements are 
constantly negotiated as both organizational activities and member interests change over 
time (Borras et al. 2008; Bebbington 2007; Edelman 2008). 
Effectiveness refers to organizational capacity to deliver on expectations, manage 
existing activities and develop new ones appropriately (see Bebbington et al. 1993). 
Community-based organizations nearing a generational transition are pushed to formalize 
and institutionalize decision making and administrative procedures that in initial stages 
may have been more flexible and informal. Increasing their effectiveness in rapidly 
changing contexts requires increased internal differentiation and complexity.  
Problems of representation and effectiveness shape a third problem of maintaining 
legitimacy. Community-based organizations lose internal legitimacy if they fail to adapt 
their agendas sufficiently to the changing interests of their members or are unable to 
institutionalize and sustain initial activities, often established with external support. As 
their internal legitimacy is lost, they also lose external legitimacy with external 
institutional supporters as effective promoters of environmental and social gains for their 
members (Edelman 2008; Bebbington et al. 1993). 
Responsiveness is in large part a problem of governance. CBF organizations must 
adapt governance structures and procedures to encourage effective adaption to rapidly 
changing contexts, while ensuring ongoing commitment to the interests and objectives of 
the communities that are vital to the organization’s future viability. 
III. Designing second generation CBF organizations 
How are the participants of these CBF organizations, their supporters and 
researchers to move toward a new generation of organization? This problem of 
organizational “adaptive capacity” is addressed in organizational literature, but is largely 
lacking overlooked in governance literature. For example, a large and influential 
“movement” of Common Property Resources (CPR) research and practice has emerged 
in recent years to guide the organization of community-based resource management for 
conservation and development. Much of this literature has proposed a priori 
organizational structural design principles often found to be associated with effective 
collective management of natural resources. Nevertheless, below we build on the 	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experiences of two CBF organizations now immersed in transitions from first to second 
generation organization and argue that their experiences suggest elements of a “reflexive 
governance” process that simultaneously pursues adaptation to new pressures while 
retaining commitment to organizational principles underlying their past success. 
Common property resource theory 
Elinor Ostrom’s design principles for collective action  predict the likelihood that 
communities will be able to manage common pool resources effectively. Ostrom’s 
“institutional choice” framework focuses on rules governing benefits and costs, 
participation levels, systematic monitoring, effective sanctions and conflict resolution and 
external recognition of communities’ rights to govern their own resources (1990). 
Ostrom’s work in large part inspired the development of the influential international 
Common Property Resources (CPR) interdisciplinary research and practice movement 
(IACP 2009). Her rule-based design principles have been widely tested and adapted in 
many cases across the globe (e.g. Oakerson 1992; Sekher 2001). Ostrom’s selection in 
2009 for the Nobel Prize for Economics underscores the contribution of CPR’s 
community-based alternative to Hardin’s (1968) prediction of inevitable environmental 
degradation without strong state regulation or privatization.  
Nevertheless, the rational choice theory roots of the institutional choice approach, 
and of much of the CPR movement more generally, may lead to the privileging of 
individual rationality in response to self-governing rules, rather than historical and 
cultural context as the primary drivers of social actors’ behavior (Sick 2008). Further, 
much CPR research adopts a largely a priori approach to organizational design, with 
organizational structures devised according to pre-established and tested principles. CPR 
theory and research tend to stress institutions-as-rules, largely overlooking organizational 
structures required to coordinate behavior pursuant to these rules. As an empirical 
problem, the CPR literature is generally silent to organizational structure and adaptive 
capacity. Community organization is viewed as largely static and locally bounded (Steins 
and Edwards 1999). CPR often pays too little attention to communities’ operation across 
scales, and to the fact that their opportunities and limits are shaped by a larger political 
economic context (Gautam and Shivakoti 2005; Sick 2008; Steins and Edwards 1999). 
Finally, with significant exceptions, such as Ostrom’s own suggestion of “nested 	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enterprises” (1990); Berkes “cross-scale linkages” (2002) and Britt’s “networks” (2002), 
CPR research has focused most on local community organization (Bebbington 1996; 
Antinori and Garcia López 2008).  
“New economic sociology’’ and the theory of embeddedness 
This paper focuses on secondary level community associations rather than 
community-based organization. These representative organizations serve as umbrella 
structures that provide member communities with a range of services, including 
representation and advocacy of member interests, channeling of external assistance or 
direct provision of assistance, production coordination, and other services. We draw on 
insights from new economic sociology’s concept of “embeddedness” and adapt them to 
natural resource governance problems to analyze how successful secondary level CBF 
organizations may navigate change in ways both empowered and limited by their 
community-based character.  
Karl Polanyi’s seminal work The Great Transformation explicitly countered 
assumptions of neoclassical economics that economic action derives from individuals’ 
“natural” propensities for trade (to truck and barter, as Adam Smith (1970) put it. Polanyi 
argued by contrast that humans’ economic activities are “embedded” in social relations 
and institutions (1944: 476-59). Krippner remarks that Polanyi’s embeddedness is “a kind 
of shorthand for his method of studying institutions as concrete, multiply-determined 
objectives that could contain various social processes simultaneously” (2001: 804). 
Subsequent new economic sociologists have analyzed how economic behavior is 
embedded in social networks (Granovetter 1985), macroeconomic structure (Fligstein 
1996; Zukin and DiMaggio 1990; Smelser and Swedberg 2005), politics, culture and 
organization (Mohr and Friedland 2008; Powell and DiMaggio 1991).  
Polanyi’s embeddedness theory suggests an interpretive and methodological 
framework for exploring how organizational structural choices are shaped by their 
location in specific historical configurations of social structure, social actors and power. 
The way community-based forestry organizations operate and change is likely embedded 
in community history, ecological conditions, and culture and social structures as well as 
larger legal and policy frameworks, political arenas and markets. The diverse activities 
these organizations pursue attempt to achieve embedded environmental, economic, 	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political and social objectives that may at times promote contradictory organizational 
logics, strain organizational resources, and pose internal conflicts of interests.  
Our comparison of two secondary level CBF associations, the Public Lands 
Partnership in Colorado and the Association of Forest Communities of Petén, Guatemala, 
conceptualizes community-based organizations as processes that change in response to 
shifting structural conditions rather than as sets of static organizational processes and 
procedures (Argyris and Schön 1987; Brechin et al. 2003; Perrow 1986; Steins and 
Edwards 1999). It focuses on the collective organizational processes through which PLP 
and ACOFOP participants experiment and adapt while struggling to maintain sufficient 
representation, equity, legitimacy and responsiveness. 
IV. The case studies 
With some exceptions (Britt, 2002; Rosen 2008; Taylor, 2010; Taylor and Zabin 
2000), relatively little systematic research has been done on secondary level associations 
that represent and promote their community-based members’ interests (Antinori and 
Garcia López 2008: 3). Moreover, very little comparative research has examined the 
cross-national experiences of community forestry associations or examined problems 
unique to organizations undergoing generational transitions. Nevertheless, much can be 
learned from a comparative approach to the experiences of community forestry 
organizations in the global North and South (see further Charnley and Moe 2007).  
The experiences of the Public Lands Partnership in Colorado and the Association 
of Forest Communities of Petén pose instructive differences, including the varying nature 
of land ownership and tenure regimes, their members’ relationships to the forest, how 
they gained historical access to and control over the forest resource and the diverse 
problems emerging from embeddedness in distinct social, political and economic 
contexts. At the same time, both organizations confront similar problems as initiatives 
nearing the end of an initial stage of development. These include internal and external 
pressures that push them to move beyond pilot to sustained programs, expand and 
diversify existing activities, formalize decision making and procedures, manage 
leadership transitions and confront increasingly complex political and environmental 
challenges. Moreover, they must navigate this process of change while managing 	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ongoing “normal” problems of representation, effectiveness, legitimacy and 
responsiveness. 
The Public Lands Partnership of Colorado 
The PLP emerged to address the management of the Grand Mesa, Uncompahgre, 
and Gunnison National Forests (GMUG) overseen by the USFS in Western Colorado, 
USA. First established in the early 1900’s, the GMUG has been an important contributor 
to the region’s economy and communities’ livelihoods for over a century. However, 
public forest governance rules shifted beginning in the late 1980s away from economic 
utilization to protection of natural resources (Baden and Snow 1997). Additionally, 
demographic and economic changes were occurring in many Western US rural 
communities driven by in-migrants seeking the region’s amenity values (i.e., natural 
scenery, outdoor recreation, wildlife viewing), rather than for natural resource 
commodity employment (Hansen et al. 2002). Tensions between so-called “newcomers” 
and long-time residents surfaced in response to national forest management proposals, as 
lines were drawn between those in favor of, and opposed to, continued economic 
utilization of public lands and natural resources. 
Funded and led by local governments and citizens, PLP is a secondary level 
community association that serves as a civic forum for diverse sets of stakeholders to 
engage in collaborative learning, manage conflicts, and encourage the development of 
management proposals that simultaneously sustain the GMUG’s ecological values while 
providing economic and social benefits to surrounding communities. An executive 
committee serves as a coordinating body, but the PLP itself operated as an informal 
gathering of individuals from government, non-governmental, and civic organizations. 
Between 1993 and 2000, PLP developed into an important local governance institution as 
it brought multiple stakeholders and organizations together to steer how public forest 
management issues were being defined and deliberated. 
As the PLP began to demonstrate progress as a civic learning and conflict 
management forum, it was presented with the opportunity to develop its own set of public 
forest stewardship projects. In late 1999, the Ford Foundation announced a request for 
proposals to participate in its Community-Based Forestry Demonstration Program 
(CBFDP), a 5-year, US$15 million investment in community-based initiatives or 	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organizations around the U.S. involved in linking the restoration and enhancement of 
forest ecosystems with increasing the well-being of communities reliant on forests 
(Wyckoff-Baird 2005). The PLP was one of 13 successful applicants, providing financial 
resources of nearly US$610,000 over five years to make larger, more durable impacts to 
enhance the linkage between national forest stewardship and community well being. 
Combining these resources with contributions from federal, state, and local 
governments participating in the PLP, the PLP was able to initiate or catalyze several 
demonstration projects. The first involved the restoration of the 570,000 ha Uncompahgre 
Plateau. Through a series of meetings convened by the PLP in 2000 and 2001, federal 
and state natural resource agencies and the PLP pooled together nearly US$4 million in 
funds to conduct a landscape analysis, design restoration demonstration projects, and 
develop a native seed cultivation and management program. The restoration projects 
employed local contractors, thereby providing economic benefits to adjacent 
communities while achieving ecological goals. 
As grant money and on-the-ground resource management projects increased from 
2001-2005, the PLP had no organizational structure to manage the funds. The federal and 
state agencies that were pooling funds into the Uncompahgre Plateau restoration program 
required their money to be handled differently in different sub-accounts. There was also a 
need for a mechanism to handle Memoranda of Understanding, budgets, work plans, 
contracts, and auditing procedures. As a volunteer-driven, “flat” organization, PLP lacked 
capacity. Developing and sustaining public forest-related stewardship programs would 
have necessitated a more formalized structure, such as an incorporated organization with 
501(c)(3) status.
2 Following this path would require a formalized governing board and 
paid staff to conduct strategic and annual work planning, coordinate projects and 
programs, and raise funds. The informality that characterized the relationships and 
communications among PLP participants might have given way to more formal decision-
making procedures. Given the resistance of PLP participants to formalize, the decision 
was made to create a separate incorporated administrative structure, leading to the 
creation of UncCom as a 501(c)(3) fiscal agent in 2001. 
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Ford Foundation funds were also used to create a community planning and 
monitoring demonstration project for the Burn Canyon Salvage Timber Sales, a 
controversial set of logging projects in a post-wildfire forested area to generate income 
for the USFS to offset rehabilitation. PLPs newfound resources allowed it to expand 
beyond a dialogue forum to managing on-the-ground stewardship projects; 
concomitantly, its role in public forest governance changed. 
When the Ford grant ended in Fall 2005, PLP was confronted with a set of 
strategic choices that had implications for its future growth and direction. In short, would 
the PLP expand from pilot demonstration projects for community and government 
agency education to investing in long-term programs around the Uncompahgre Plateau 
restoration and community monitoring of various GMUG forest management projects? 
This choice was fraught with several implications. First, PLP would have had to develop 
a more formalized organizational structure and direct its energies to raising and managing 
funds. PLP had confronted this issue as a matter of necessity in 2001, when it created 
UncCom. However, in late 2005, the choice was a matter of strategy. By focusing on 
grants, it was feared that the primary mission of the PLP would be subsumed by a 
primary motivation to sustain adequate funding to support staffing and programs. 
Additionally, PLP has been an intentionally flat organization in which participants from 
government and non-government groups interact on a level field. There is no formal 
representation, voting procedures, or position statements. Many PLP participants desired 
to maintain this non-bureaucratic structure. 
On the other hand, by ending PLP’s involvement and funding support for 
successful projects such as the Uncompahgre Plateau restoration and Burn Canyon 
projects, there was the danger that these projects would not be fully realized, thereby 
reducing their effectiveness as community and government agency learning 
opportunities, as well as their potential for producing long-term ecological, economic, 
and community benefits. Ultimately, the Executive Committee of the PLP decided – 
although it was not a unanimous decision – to return to its original purpose as a civic 
forum and facilitator of public forest management conflicts, and to not expand on 
demonstration projects. 	 ﾠ 11   
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This decision has subsequently affected the ability of PLP to maintain its 
relevance. The Uncompahgre Plateau restoration project, for example has evolved to the 
point of establishing a 7,000 ha forest restoration program that will generate commercial 
timber harvests, support local employment, and involve a community monitoring 
component. This program is now being coordinated by the Uncompahgre Plateau Project 
(UPP), an incorporated 501(c)(3) not-for-profit organization. Collaborative stakeholder 
learning, planning, implementation, and monitoring occurs under UPP rather than the 
PLP. 
Four additional challenges have confounded PLP in its search to be reflexive. The 
first concerns PLP participants’ competing interests over how to best link public forest 
management and community well-being. One example involved a proposed project to 
reduce forest wildfire risks to electricity transmission powerlines traversing the 
Uncompahgre Plateau by thinning or clear-felling trees in proximity to those powerlines. 
Local forest industries participating on the PLP saw a benefit from these management 
practices and federal, state, and local governments saw the benefit of protecting a 
valuable public infrastructure. However, there was considerable discomfort among PLP’s 
environmental constituencies concerning the ecological impacts of the project. By the 
same token, PLP’s environmental and recreation-oriented participants pursued a project 
to designate a large unroaded area of the Uncompahgre Plateau as official Wilderness. 
Wilderness designation has been historically controversial because it removes public land 
from any future management activities that can produce commercial products, such as 
timber or livestock grazing. 
Second, as an open forum, the PLP was subject to changing internal participation. 
New participants propose new directions that have sometimes resulted in tensions with 
original members. At the same time, founding members found it challenging to maintain 
PLP’s focus on issues and projects while accommodating the interests and issues of new 
members. The Burn Canyon Salvage monitoring project, for example, has since lost 
interest among newer PLP participants, leaving the project to be maintained by a select 
group of individuals on their own time.  
Third, changes in PLP’s leadership have caused disruptions. Having been in 
existence for over 15 years, many of PLPs founding members have either left or reduced 	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their involvement. Since the original coordinator stepped down in early 2006, the PLP 
has gone through two coordinators, each with their own vision and leadership style. 
Furthermore, changing leadership in federal and state agencies and non-governmental 
organizations, and election of new local government officials has changed participation in 
the PLP.  
Lastly, changes in the external socio-political environment have raised questions 
about PLP’s ability to adapt. Because the USFS is the authorized custodian for the 
GMUG, it must be attentive and responsive to the public at large, not just a local group of 
self-appointed collaborators. The lack of explicit budget line items or rewards for line 
officers means that proposals generated by collaborative efforts are not fully 
implemented. Additionally, the attitudes of individual line officers against interacting 
with collaborative groups can truncate any ongoing effort. Since line officers rotate 
frequently, a new line officer might choose to be less engaged with the PLP as the 
previous officer. 
For the PLP in particular, and other similar community-based collaborative 
forestry groups in general, there has been a drop-off in philanthropic foundation giving 
due in large part to the economic downturn, especially since 2008. Prior to PLP’s 
receiving of the Ford Foundation grant, they operated on a budget of $15,000-20,000 
which was primarily used to sponsor public education events, field trips, or experts 
invited to provide scientific or technical assistance. With the Ford grant, PLP’s annual 
budget averaged $300,000, a substantial portion of which went to contracts for on-the-
ground stewardship projects. With the expiration of the Ford grant, PLP’s budget has 
returned to a nominal level, with county and municipal governments contributing the 
lion’s share. With the lack of options for larger operating budgets through philanthropic 
charities, PLP’s ability to be effective resource stewards is extremely limited. 
The Association of Forest Communities of Péten, Guatemala 
The Association of Forest Communities of Petén (ACOFOP) leads a diverse 
group of communities and community-based associations that have won rights to manage 
nearly 500,000 ha of forest in the Multiple Use Zone (MUZ) of the Maya Biosphere 
Reserve (MBR) in northern Guatemala (Cronkleton et al. 2008; Gómez and Méndez 
2005; Monterroso and Barry 2007; Taylor 2010). The MBR’s implementation since its 	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creation in 1990 has been shaped by the Petén’s high levels of conflict and the frequent 
absence of state control. The MBR’s design originally failed to take into account pre-
existing settlements and resource related interests (Cronkleton et al., 2008; Gómez and 
Méndez 2005). The community concessions were an experiment produced originally by 
unique circumstances in the mid 1990s, including strong international interest in 
preserving the Petén’s natural and cultural wealth in support of a larger Mesoamerican 
Biological Corridor, broad skepticism about state and private industry capacities for 
conservation, and pressures to distribute land and resources to peasant communities as 
part of the 1996 Peace Accords ending Guatemala’s 30 year Civil War (Cronkleton et al. 
2008; Gómez and Méndez 2005; Monterroso 2007). 
ACOFOP today has 23 member communities and organizations directly 
representing nearly 2,000 individuals. Its members include indigenous and ladino 
(ethnically mixed) communities and a range of for-profit and not-for-profit associations. 
ACOFOP itself does not manage forest resources directly, but rather represents members 
with 25 year government forest concessions governed by five-year sustainable 
management plans approved by the Guatemalan National Commission for Protected 
Areas (CONAP). Reliable time series data on the conservation and development impacts 
of ACOFOP and its members is still limited, but several studies point to significant 
positive conservation and social impacts (Bray et al. 2008; Nittler and Tschinkel 2005; 
Radachowsky et al. 2004; WCS et al. 2004).
3 ACOFOP, its leaders and its community-
based members have won prestigious awards, including a Guatemalan Presidential 
Environment Award, a UNDP Equatorial Award for Excellence and the World 
Conservation Union’s Environmental Torch Award. ACOFOP’s Executive Director in 
2005 received the National Geographic Society’s Award for Conservation Leadership, 
the first time an individual in Latin American has won this award. 
The community forest concessions represented and supported by ACOFOP are 
now 15 years into their 25 year contracts. Commercial timber management and 
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Center for International Forestry Research research and assistance project in support of 
grassroots forest organizations in Central America and Brazil (Cronkleton et al. 2008; 
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commercialization have been the principle vehicle for convincing community members, 
government officials and external conservationist and development institution 
stakeholders that communities can be partners in conservation. The first years involved a 
very steep learning curve for all as communities struggled to learn forest management 
and develop commercial timber activities. Some communities, such as Carmelita and 
Uaxactún, were “forest communities” with extensive histories of experience with 
nontimber forest products, but little experience with timber management. Many 
community members were skeptical or even resisted timber management, equating it with 
deforestation or the extractive abuses of private actors in the past.  
Today, growing internal pressures between existing concession members and 
community residents who do not participate in the concessions are leading ACOFOP to 
promote expansion of collectively organized activities into non-timber forest products. 
Many members, especially in “forest communities” such as Carmelita and Uaxactún, had 
extensive experience as individual contractors or harvest workers in xate, chicle gum or 
tourism. However, the communities had not organized to collectively manage NTFPs as 
they have with commercial timber.  
ACOFOP and several key member communities are now promoting collectively 
organized xate jade palm, chicle gum and tourism as income generating activities that can 
expand the number of concession participants. NTFPs are also expected to increase 
legitimacy among external conservationists who oppose logging in any form and doubt 
the communities’ capacity to be effective resource stewards. These new collective 
resource management activities require more complex management and coordination. 
They often pose contradictory organizational logics for sponsoring organizations. They 
introduce new actors into resource management, including concession members and non-
members in the communities with significant vested interest in conventional NTFP 
organization (Taylor 2010).  
At the community level, the concessions are organized according in diverse 
forms, including cooperatives, not-for-profit and for-profit associations. Some 
communities clearly separate concession activities from local level political leadership 
while in others the lines of political and resource management decision-making and 
accounting are more blurred. There remain today significant administrative weaknesses 	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in some concession organizations, exacerbated by generally low formal education levels, 
lack of administrative experience, and frequent difficulties in separating community 
leaders’ administrative from political functions.  
Both the community concession organizations and ACOFOP face pressing needs 
to develop more formal and sophisticated organizational structures and procedures 
capable of handling the new administrative demands of an increasingly complex 
environment. The diversification of collectively organized forest activities requires more 
complex coordination and decision-making from existing community-based 
organizations. As they become involved in collective NTFPs, the communities confront 
conflicting organizational logics, competition between diverse activities for seasonal 
labor, vested interests in traditional resource management systems, and new questions of 
how to track and distribute profits and losses from multiple activities within a single 
organizational framework (Taylor 2010). ACOFOP, for its part, began as a political 
organization pressing for community resource rights. Since the communities won those 
rights, ACOFOP has taken on new roles, including helping coordinate external assistance 
to the communities, providing technical assistance via a small staff of extensionists, and 
more recently, helping coordinate collectively organized xate, chicle and tourism 
activities. As a result, ACOFOP now incorporates several internal units, including 
political lobbying and organization; accounting; extension; and facilities.  
Much of the current leadership of ACOFOP and influential community-based 
member organizations is still drawn from the initial generation of leaders who fought, 
often at great personal risk, to win community access to the MBR’s resources. ACOFOP 
is still led by one of these pioneering leader. Its Executive Director is a charismatic leader 
who was a key actor in negotiating the first community concessions and who today 
enjoys a very high level of local, national and international credibility. Though a number 
of younger leaders are assuming responsible roles in member organizations, ACOFOP 
itself has not yet transitioned to a new generation of leadership. In the medium term, 
whether ACOFOP could successfully weather a leadership transition without losing 
important internal and external credibility is an important question.  
ACOFOP and the community concessions face significant challenges to their 
viability as recognized stewards of the MBR’s resources. Although most of the 	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concessions are widely viewed as making positive conservation and development 
impacts, four of the weaker concessions in particular currently suffer worsening problems 
of deforestation, expansion of farming and cattle ranching, and organizational weakness. 
While the violations of sustainable management plans are largely caused by powerful 
external landowners unconnected to the concessions, the community concessions are held 
responsible for sustainable resource management in their assigned areas by the state, and 
influential national and international groups.  
Moreover, strong pressures are being levied from powerful external actors to 
protect and develop the Petén cultural and natural resources via more strict 
preservationist approaches and, somewhat counter-intuitively, via large –scale 
commercial tourism. Recent controversies over how to protect and develop the Mirador 
Basin’s archaeological treasures, even at the expense of the community concessions’ 
legal prerogatives, highlight these significant threats. ACOFOP and the concession are 
under great pressure to correct existing weaknesses in the weaker concessions and gain a 
more influential role in negotiations surrounding the future development and protection 
of the region’s resources (Monterroso 2007; Taylor 2010). 
Organizational change and organizing principles in the PLP and ACOFOP 
The PLP and ACOFOP and their members confront these challenges of transition 
while struggling to maintain key organizational principles that have underlain much of 
their success until now: representation, effectiveness, legitimacy and responsiveness (see 
Table 1). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Representation 
With respect to representation, the PLP has always kept an open-door policy and 
has not excluded any organization or stakeholder interest from participating. 
Furthermore, participants on the PLP do not attend as formal representatives of their 
organizations, but come explicitly as individuals with a particular perspective on public 
forest land management. The PLP has maintained participation from municipal and 
county governments, commodity and recreation users of surrounding public forest lands, 
conservation organizations, civic groups, and interested individual citizens. However, due 
to its voluntary nature, PLP has also had problems keeping a full, diverse representation 	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actively engaged. At its inception, much of PLP’s attention was devoted to retaining 
livelihoods of traditional commodity users, such as forest industry, livestock ranching, 
and coal mining. Over time, recreation and environmental interests have worked on 
initiatives to address their interests. There remains tension between PLP participants 
interested in maintaining commodity-based livelihoods and those interested in non-
commodity, ecological or amenity-based values. 
Two populations with a stake in public forest management have been under-
represented: Native Americans and Hispanics. The Northern Ute tribe had historically 
occupied the region, but was forced out in the 1880s with encroaching European-
American settlement. The PLP did make efforts to reach out and engage the Northern 
Utes, however, as a sovereign nation, tribes do not see themselves as participants in 
multi-stakeholder collaborative processes, but as equals with the US government in land 
management. The Hispanic population is a small but important part of the natural 
resource labor economy in the region. Social networks and recruiting efforts among PLP 
participants to the Hispanic community are limited. 
There also remains a philosophical and constitutional issue of having a self-
appointed local group serving as a public voice in public forest policy and management. 
Although the PLP does not claim to formally represent any particular set of interests or 
the public as a whole, there is an undercurrent that PLP is not a legitimate entity when it 
comes to public processes associated with public forest planning and decision-making. 
In related fashion, for ACOFOP and its concession members, representativeness 
is a significant ongoing issue. First, the community concessions were originally granted 
to local residents who organized to solicit government concessions, but not all residents 
of concession communities chose to participate initially. Second, the organizational 
framework of the concessions varies, with some organized as cooperatives and others as 
for-profit and as not-for-profit associations. As the concessions have enjoyed relative 
success and have generated significant new income, tensions between members and non-
member residents have become a serious concern. Moreover, ACOFOP’s 23 members 
include both 13 concession holding communities and associations and other types of 
community-based organizations. The new organized diversified forest activities introduce 
new representation-related issues, including whether to distribute benefits to all 	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concession members as currently done with commercial timber, or only to participants in 
the new activities. ACOFOP must effectively represent and manage these diverse 
constituencies if it is to pursue its political agenda and fulfill its function of effective 
promotion of the members’ forest-related activities. 
Critics of the community concession system have pointed to inequities in the 
distribution of concession benefits. One study (Tropico Verde 2004) argued that benefits 
are few and limited almost exclusively to members. ACOFOP and its concessions’ 
participants respond that jobs, income and profit do accrue to some non-members, 
especially in concessions that require investment of some returns in community projects 
(Nittler and Tshinkel 2005). But they also argue that they have struggled, invested and 
risked much to establish the system. “It would be nice to have everybody inside the 
system” said one ACOFOP leader, “but that would mean someone could come along later 
and eat the same amount of cake. It’s not fair to require that” (Taylor 2010). 
Nevertheless, ACOFOP sees the task of improving the representativeness of the 
concession system in the communities in which it operates as a very high priority.  
Effectiveness 
Both organizations have struggled to create and maintain adequate levels of 
organizational capacity. The decline in funding and the maturation of PLP spin-off 
organizations such as the Uncompahgre Plateau Project and Unc.Com has limited the role 
and effectiveness of the PLP in the past 5 years. PLP has insufficient organizational 
capacity to take on a large stewardship project such as the Uncompahgre Plateau 
restoration or the Burn Canyon Salvage monitoring projects. It retains a coordinator on a 
part-time basis, has a small operating budget, and relies on volunteers for its executive 
committee and membership. It still serves as a forum for collaborative learning and 
deliberation, but, due to its success over the past 15 years, there are now other informal, 
ad hoc forums for learning outside of the PLP. It can be argued that PLP has transformed 
communication and collaboration between governmental entities and non-governmental 
stakeholders with regard to public forest management to the point that it is no longer a 
key facilitator. On the other hand, PLP still exists as the sole venue in which this diversity 
of organizations and interests can convene around public forest issues. 	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For ACOFOP and its members, forest management has involved a steep learning 
curve, especially for those communities with little prior experience with commercial 
timber. Nittler and Tskinkel pointed to significant organizational problems rooted in 
generally low formal education levels, lack of administrative experience, frequent 
turnover of elected leadership, lack of commercialization skills and difficulties among 
diverse concession organizations to collaborate in joint ventures (2005). Though CONAP 
officials spoke in interviews in 2005 that some 80 percent of the concessions were on a 
“path to a better future”, in 2008, the weakest four ACOFOP-affiliated concessions along 
the San Andrés road suffered significant problems with violations of its concession plans 
that threatened to undermine external support for the concession system (ACOFOP 2008, 
WCS et al. 2004: 16, Bray et al. 2009; Trópico Verde 2005; Cortave, personal 
communication 2008). 
In addition to these organizational capacity problems, as ACOFOP and its 
members embark on diversified collective forest activities, including xate, chicle and 
tourism, they confront new organizational procedures, new participants, and new 
organizational logics. Guariguata et al. (2008) explore interactions between commercial 
timber and NTFP activities and suggest that at times organizational contradictions arise 
between the two. The newly organized NTFP activities operate not in isolation, but in the 
context of multipurpose organizations, both at the secondary level of ACOFOP and at the 
local level of concession members. Conflicts rooted in diverse seasonal timing of 
activities, material characteristics of the product or service, accounting policies and the 
varying interests of participating communities and individuals, can all create pressures to 
fragment rather than integrate multiple activities in pursuit of a unified development 
strategy (Taylor 2010).  
Legitimacy 
As they have struggled with issues of representation and effectiveness, both PLP 
and ACOFOP have strived to maintain their own embeddedness in community interests 
and perspectives, a problem of legitimacy. PLP has always faced legitimacy issues, 
especially from public interest organizations who resisted any inference that PLP 
somehow represented a representative public voice in public forest management in 
Western Colorado. During the revision of the GMUG forest plan, a policy document that 	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sets priorities for the next 10-15 years, stakeholders not directly involved in the PLP 
resisted attempts by the PLP to be a co-convener of public involvement processes, 
claiming that it does not fully represent or reflect the preferences of the broader public. 
Given the PLP’s intentional aversion to having formal representation from 
organizations, it is not clear how participants interact with their home organizations with 
regard to PLP initiatives. PLP participants are under no obligation to commit their home 
organizations’ resources or support for any project. As a forum for learning and 
information and knowledge exchange, participants are only expected to inform their 
home organizations of PLP projects; similarly, PLP participants are under no obligation 
to subject their home organizations’ work to approval or sanctioning by PLP. In many 
instances, it was the initiative of individual participants to advance the relationship 
between PLP and participating organizations. As long-time participants left and new 
participants joined PLP, so did the relationships between PLP and participating 
organizations. The reliance on individual rather than institutional relationships makes 
such relationships tenuous and subject to individual personalities. 
ACOFOP and its member concessions have since the first years struggled to 
establish and maintain the legitimacy of a community role in managing the MBR’s 
resources. Commercial timber has long been the vehicle for showing community 
members that conservation can yield short and long term benefits. The internal legitimacy 
of the new diversified activities will depend much on how well existing and new 
participants are represented in the activities’ administration and how equitably benefits 
are distributed. Externally, the concessions’ successful involvement in the new activities 
will require recognition by powerful actors at multiple levels, including key government 
agencies and external conservation and development institutions.  
Moreover, ACOFOP and the concessions must ensure that the new diversification 
does not lead to the “disembedding” of activities from the communities that gave them 
birth. The introduction of highly diverse production activities, constituents and interests 
could pose seemingly contradictory organizational logics that distance a single activity 
from community objectives, promoting fragmentation and undermining unity. For 
example, some participants in the xate activity in 2007 advocated separating their 
accounts from those of the sponsoring concession organization. Others argued that profits 	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should be distributed only to direct participants rather than to the community’s 
concession members. Still others planned for a future separate xate firm legally distinct 
from the community concession. 
Responsiveness  
The above discussed problems of representativeness, effectiveness and legitimacy 
together have significant implications for a fourth organizational principle: 
responsiveness. Organizational responsiveness is at its heart a problem of governance. 
What kind of governance arrangement is required to adapt effectively to new internal and 
external pressures, while maintaining a commitment to the interests of the communities 
that gave birth to these organizational experiences? Due to the PLP’s informal, voluntary 
structure, it does not produce strategic plans, annual work plans or annual reports. It has 
an annual “all-members” meeting at which all participating members are invited to attend 
to review the past year’s activities and discuss current and future work. Accountability 
for PLP comes from participants continued participation; they “vote with their feet”, 
either maintaining their participation by attending meetings or they drop out. This can be 
regarded as a strength of PLP: the relevance and legitimacy of PLP is determined by who 
voluntarily participates and contributes. That PLP is still in existence after 15 years is a 
testament to its relevance and responsiveness. However, it is debatable that current 
participation fully reflects the interests and values of all stakeholders interested and 
affected by public forest management on the GMUG. For example, PLP has seen a 
decline in traditional commodity interests in favor of recreation and conservation interest. 
The forest industry, for example, is no longer an active member, although it maintains its 
participation. With the departure of several founding members, the ranching community 
no longer has a presence. As other entities have spun-off and matured, these interests 
have dedicated their involvement to those spin-offs as they have a more direct impact on 
resource stewardship. Emerging issues such as ecological restoration and renewable 
biomass energy are being addressed outside of PLP by these spin-offs or entirely new 
partnership efforts, such as the Renewable Energy Development Initiative involving the 
local rural electricity association, the USFS, and forest industry. 
It can be argued that the spin-offs and new partnerships are a product of PLP’s 
success; without PLP, it is conceivable that the capacity would not exist for these efforts 	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to become established and thrive. This reality raises the issue of whether community-
based governance efforts such as PLP should have a planned sunset, either transforming 
into a different purpose and structure, or dissolving altogether as needs and issues are met 
through other venues. As is so often the case, organizations seek to persist beyond their 
initial raison d’etre, raising questions about their capacity to be responsive in the face of 
other competing organizations. 
For its part, ACOFOP has a dual governance structure of elected leaders and 
professional staff that aim to keep this representative organization effective yet 
responsive to its members. It is governed by a general assembly of members, an 
administrative council of concession representatives headed by an elected president and a 
three-member oversight committee. ACOFOP’s Executive Director manages its small 
paid staff; he is a member of a local community but holds no single concession 
membership (Taylor 2010). The governance arrangements of ACOFOP’s affiliated 
community concessions vary by organizational model: cooperative, for-profit and not-
for-profit associations, but generally include similar member assemblies, elected 
leadership and remunerated staff members. The governance arrangements, as with similar 
community-based organizations elsewhere, suffer significant weaknesses, but generally 
strive to balance effective resource and production management with the need to remain 
responsive to member needs and interests.  
The addition of collectively organized xate, chicle and tourism activities to 
commercial timber calls for the rethinking of governance arrangements in participating 
concession organizations and in ACOFOP itself. How should they organize to manage 
each new activity effectively, within the larger context of the concession system? 
ACOFOP and its members are experimenting with three organizational alternatives. The 
first is to decentralize each forest activity by productive sector. Collective xate 
participants, for example, have formed a separate xate committee and some advocate the 
creation of a separate firm. This decentralized system could be more flexible, with its 
“arms-length market relationship” (Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001: 14), yet it could encourage 
separation from the sponsoring concession organization. A second alternative involves 
ACOFOP directly, marshalling its expertise and credibility to directly coordinate NTFP 
production as it has with the collective chicle activity. This, however, threatens to involve 	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ACOFOP too closely in economic production, potentially undermining its legitimacy as 
political representative of all concession members. A third alternative suggested is to 
involve the community-owned forest services firm, FORESCOM, in the NTFPs with 
ACOFOP advising as a Board Member. This would allow ACOFOP to balance economic 
coordination and assistance with political support of the general concession system, but 
would require significantly strengthening FORESCOM first. It is not yet clear which 
alternative or alternative ACOFOP and its members will pursue (Taylor 2010). 
VI. Conclusion 
Seeing community-based organizations as embedded can provide analysts, 
advocates and participants with a framework for analyzing and acting on the complex set 
of pressures these organizations face. The reflexive governance posture views those 
organizations’ structural choices within a context of embeddedness in multiple contexts 
across scales, allowing the unpacking of diverse, often conflicting organizational logics, 
shifting relationships among stakeholders, interests and perspectives, and the reality of 
organizational objectives changing over time.  
As organizations near significant moments of transition, the opportunity and even 
requirement for structural choices appears, with important implications for existing and 
potential participants, organizational objectives and future directions of change. Choices 
are made that lead the organization to change, ceasing some activities and adopting new 
ones, reaffirming or deemphasizing commitments to existing participants or assuming 
commitments to new ones and possibly, dissolving some or all existing organizational 
arrangements and creating new ones. The key issue is not so much whether the new 
organizational arrangements remain faithful to their original objectives, but rather, 
whether they remain appropriately responsive to the organization’s constituents and its 
ever-changing environment. 
The PLP and ACOFOP today find themselves at a moment of transition with 
those sorts of structural choices. Both organizations face new organizational challenges: 
transitioning leadership; need for more formal and diversified decision making, growth 
beyond pilot to sustained programs and expansion beyond original forest-related 
activities. Much depends on how those organizations manage the organizing principles of 
representation, effectiveness, and legitimacy discussed in the previous section. These 	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three shape the larger issue of an organization’s governance: how it organizes and 
reorganizes to remain appropriately responsive to its participants and its environment. 
PLP’s representativeness has been shaped by its flexibility. Members come as 
individuals rather than as official representatives. This open door policy has allowed it to 
be inclusive, yet it has also created instability as individuals over time cease to 
participate. Original constituencies such as traditional forest user and rancher groups have 
been largely displaced by amenity and recreational users. ACOFOP’s members, by 
contrast, until recently discouraged new participants despite the fact that participants are 
official representatives of their communities and community organizations. Increasing 
tensions between concession members and community residents who are not concession 
members leads ACOFOP to seek more inclusive activities to improve its 
representativeness. 
Both PLP and ACOFOP have struggled to increase their effectiveness, their 
capacity to manage forest-related activities, constrained by resource shortages and other 
problems of organizational capacity. PLP has encouraged spin-offs of successful 
activities while ACOFOP fears similar spinoffs would fragment and undermine it and its 
member community organizations. Both organizations, despite these problems, remain 
effective conveners and communication facilitators. 
PLP’s legitimacy as spokesman for its members’ interests may be weakened by 
the fact that its supporters participate as individuals rather than representatives. Some 
participants, such as forest industry and ranching groups, have left the organization, at 
least in part because of problems of internal legitimacy. That ACOFOP’s members are 
also representatives of their communities and organizations lends somewhat greater 
stability and internal legitimacy. Both organizations face external pressures from 
changing socio-political and economic contexts, shifting policy and budget priorities of 
governments and ongoing complexities related to land and resource tenure. In both 
organizations, powerful external stakeholder groups in these larger political environments 
convey or do not convey external legitimacy and shape the capacity of both to advocate 
effectively for their members’ interests.  
Finally, PLP and ACOFOP differ in their governance arrangements. PLP lacks 
many aspects of formal governance. Though it holds inclusive annual meetings, it 	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actively resisting institutionalization in conventional ways signaled by formal reports, 
plans, etc. ACOFOP by contrast, strives to maintain a regular structure of representative 
bodies with periodic general and more specialized meetings of participants at all levels. It 
maintains a public presence and advances its agenda through a website and periodic 
reports and position papers. 
Nevertheless, both PLP and ACOFOP share a reflexive approach to governance, 
which tries to take into account the embeddedness of their activities in external contexts 
in which stakeholders, interests and even objectives change over time. PLP has in some 
ways transformed itself, moving away from direct coordination of projects into a more 
exclusively facilitating role, as its members have spun off successful activities, or left to 
pursue their interests in other venues. ACOFOP in similar fashion tries actively to 
transform itself into a coordinator and facilitator of more diversified forest activities, as 
way of consolidating and make more secure a community role in resources stewardship 
in northern Guatemala. 
What do these two cases suggest as larger lessons for analysis and practice? First, 
effective organizational structure cannot be “given” a priori nor is it static in practice. As 
NRM decentralizes and devolves, and community-based governance approaches emerge, 
the organizational structure of such governance approaches has implications across 
institutional levels. This is a problem of governance, yet much research focuses on the 
architecture of international and national structural change, with much less dedicated to 
local governance. 
A critical observation our study makes is that organizations have a life cycle; 
organizations that move beyond the first generation must strategically adapt their 
structure and process to expand their work or meet new challenges. We cannot assume 
that first generation community-based organizations can or should make a transition to a 
second generation. Whether mature organizations enter new stages and remain relevant to 
their supporters’ interests or, alternatively, enter a “sunset” mode in which they become 
less relevant and even disappear, depends much on how they perform over time in 
complex, multilevel contexts in which stakeholders, interests and objectives change.  
This paper’s analytical and evaluative framework, drawing on embeddedness 
theory and focusing on organizational principles of representativeness, effectiveness, 	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legitimacy, and responsiveness, attempts to blend research and application. It calls for 
enhancing partnerships between researchers and practitioners to address pressing 
governance architecture problems. It aims to advance scholarship in environmental 
governance architecture problems, experimenting with theoretical and analytical lenses 
that cross the boundaries of disciplines, but which can expand understanding of the role 
local resource governance regimes play in the larger architecture of environmental 
governance. 
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Table	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ
Four	 ﾠOrganizational	 ﾠPrinciples	 ﾠin	 ﾠAction	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ PLP	 ﾠ ACOFOP	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Representation	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
•Open	 ﾠdoor	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
•Members	 ﾠcome	 ﾠas	 ﾠindividuals,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
official	 ﾠrepresentatives	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
organizations/communities	 ﾠ
•Tensions	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠforest	 ﾠ
community	 ﾠusers	 ﾠ(wood,	 ﾠranching)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
amenity/recreational	 ﾠusers	 ﾠ
•questioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠPLP	 ﾠis	 ﾠlegitimate	 ﾠ
spokesman	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
•Door	 ﾠto	 ﾠnew	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmostly	 ﾠ
closed;	 ﾠnow	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠinclusive.	 ﾠ
•Members	 ﾠformally	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
communities	 ﾠand	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠ
•Tensions	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠparticipants	 ﾠin	 ﾠdiverse	 ﾠ
ACOFOP	 ﾠsupported	 ﾠforest	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠ
•Lack	 ﾠof	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠ
residents	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠconcession	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠ
•ACOFOP	 ﾠis	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠrecognized	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
spokesman	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmembers.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Effectiveness	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
•Spin-ﾭ‐offs	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
decreased	 ﾠPLP’s	 ﾠrelevance	 ﾠ
•	 ﾠShortages	 ﾠof	 ﾠresources	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠ
coordination	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
•Important	 ﾠconvenor	 ﾠand	 ﾠfacilitator	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
communities’	 ﾠcommunication	 ﾠ
•Lack	 ﾠorganizational	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠmanage	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠprojects	 ﾠ
•Tries	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠnew	 ﾠNTFP	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
spin	 ﾠoff	 ﾠand	 ﾠfragment	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcessions	 ﾠ
•Shortages	 ﾠof	 ﾠresources	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠ
coordination	 ﾠ
•Important	 ﾠconvenor	 ﾠand	 ﾠfacilitator	 ﾠ
•Difficulty	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠorganizational	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠprojects	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Legitimacy	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
•Not	 ﾠseen	 ﾠby	 ﾠsome	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠstakeholders	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠlegitimate	 ﾠspokesman	 ﾠ
•Participants	 ﾠare	 ﾠindividuals,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠ
representatives	 ﾠof	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
communities	 ﾠ
•Individual	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠleads	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
instability	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠinconsistent	 ﾠ
participation.	 ﾠ
•Power	 ﾠoutsiders	 ﾠbestow	 ﾠor	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠbestow	 ﾠ
•Participants	 ﾠare	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠrepresentatives	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
communities	 ﾠand	 ﾠorganizations,	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠ
ACOFOP	 ﾠlegitimacy	 ﾠas	 ﾠspokesman	 ﾠ
•Somewhat	 ﾠmore	 ﾠstability	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠ
representative	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipants	 ﾠ
•Legitimacy	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠweaknesses	 ﾠare	 ﾠlinked	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠequity	 ﾠin	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠ
•Power	 ﾠoutsiders	 ﾠconfer	 ﾠor	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠconfer	 ﾠ
legitimacy	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 33   
	 ﾠ
legitimacy.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Responsiveness	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
•Lacks	 ﾠmany	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠformal	 ﾠ
governance:	 ﾠno	 ﾠannual	 ﾠreports,	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠ
plans,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ
•Annual	 ﾠmeeting	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“check	 ﾠ
in”	 ﾠand	 ﾠplan	 ﾠnext	 ﾠyear’s	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠ
•shifting	 ﾠconstituencies	 ﾠas	 ﾠforest	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠranchers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdropped	 ﾠout	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
amenity	 ﾠand	 ﾠrecreational	 ﾠusers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
gained	 ﾠinfluence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
•Spin-ﾭ‐offs	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠa	 ﾠsign	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
if	 ﾠit	 ﾠresults	 ﾠin	 ﾠlessened	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠrelevance	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
PLP	 ﾠ
•Regular	 ﾠmeetings,	 ﾠweb	 ﾠsite,	 ﾠreports,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ
•Some	 ﾠtension	 ﾠover	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠincorporate	 ﾠnew	 ﾠ
kinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠand	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠ
participants,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠnew	 ﾠNTFP	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠ
•Efforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠspinoffs,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
fragmentation.	 ﾠ
 